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I. INTRODUCTION
In an episode of The Simpsons entitled "King-Size Homer,"' Homer
Simpson intentionally puts on more than seventy pounds after reading that
"hyper-obesity" qualifies as a disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 2 entitling him to work from home. His new-found
girth becomes the comedic root of a litany of fat jokes, ranging from wearing
a floral muumuu to his heroic struggle to eat as much and move as little as
possible.3 Admittedly, The Simpsons is not high-brow political commentary.
Often, however, it succeeds in satirizing current debates and sentiments. This
specific episode hit on a particularly polarizing issue-discrimination against
the obese.
More than 140 million Americans over the age of twenty are
overweight.4 Of that number, about fifty-nine million' are considered obese
5
and are at a heightened risk for numerous dangerous health affects including
heart disease, hypertension, and orthopedic complications. 6 Furthermore,
Managing Editor, Ohio State Law Journal; J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law, expected 2008. B.A., Smith College, 2002.
1 The Simpsons: King-Size Homer (Fox television broadcast Nov. 5, 1995). The
episode itself makes no express reference to the Americans with Disabilities Act. But the
storyline demonstrates the myths and problems surrounding accommodation of
disabilities in the workplace. Thus, for the purposes of this Note only, I will reference the
episode as though it spoke expressly of the Act.
2 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq. (2000)).
3 The Simpsons, supra note 1.
4 American Heart Association, Statistical Fact Sheet-Risk Factors, 2007 Update,
http://www.americanheart.org/downloadable/heart/I 1685538843650VRWGT07.pdf
(considering an individual to be "overweight" if their body mass index (BMI) is greater
than 25 and "obese" if their BMI exceeds 30) (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
5 The Obesity Society, Obesity Statistics, http://naaso.org/statistics/obesity_
trends.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
6 The Obesity Society, What is Obesity, http://naaso.org/information/what-is
_obesity.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2007). It is worth noting that when the ADA was
passed into law, Congress found that 43 million Americans suffered from physical and
mental disabilities-clearly they were not including the obese in their figures. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(1) (2006). Moreover, the Supreme Court has used this finding to justify
limiting the amount of recognized disabilities. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 484 (1999) ("This figure is inconsistent with the definition of disability pressed by
petitioners.").
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America's ever-increasing size has been linked to more than one quarter of
the "phenomenal growth in health care spending over the past ... 15 years." 7
Costs and health repercussions, however, are not the only ugly side effects of.
obesity. "[F]at people are stigmatized, and are the victims of tasteless jokes
and assaults on their dignity. Despite evidence that 95-98% of diets fail over
three years, our thin-obsessed society continues to believe that fat people are
at fault for their size." 8
Although the causes of morbid obesity are still unknown, most scientists
agree that the condition is a result of more than simply eating too much and
moving too little.9 If most of us continually overeat, we get chubby or fat, but
our bodies seem to stay within a certain reasonable range regardless of
outside factors.' 0 Many obese people, however, can sustain extraordinarily
high weights while eating no more than the rest of us." Scientists have
suggested etiological, genetic, metabolic, and hormonal theories as the
possible causes of morbid obesity, 12 but no one theory seems to describe
every case. Nonetheless, despite medical evidence suggesting otherwise,
beliefs that the obese are lazy and gluttonous persist.
Weight-based discrimination is perhaps the most prominent and accepted
form of discrimination in America today. 13 However, unlike traditionally
discriminated-against groups, the obese have no specific recourse in federal
7 Ceci Connolly, Obesity Gets Part of Blame for Care Costs: Early Intervention Is
Key to Controlling Rising Health Spending, Study Author Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 20,
2004, at A3 (citing an Emory University study). See also Kathryn Hinton, Employer by
Name, Insurer by Trade: Society's Obesity Epidemic and Its Effects on Employers'
Healthcare Costs, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 137, 141-42 (2005).
8 NAAFA: National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance, http://www.naafa.org
(click on "General Information," then select "Why Should I Support NAAFA?") (last
visited Nov. 27, 2007).
9 Cecile Bouchardeau, Siobhan Nolan & Ann Reynolds, Medical Mystery: Morbid
Obesity, ABC NEWS, Jan. 17, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=
2799700&page=l.
10 Christine L. Kuss, Comment, Absolving a Deadly Sin: A Medical and Legal
Argument for Including Obesity as a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 563, 570 (1996) (describing the "set-point"
weight theory, where weight is believed to be physiologically regulated to maintain a
certain level, and a high set-point would explain recurring obesity).
11 Bouchardeau, Nolan & Reynolds, supra note 9.
12 Kuss, supra note 10, at 568-73.
13 See Dennis M. Lynch, Comment, The Heavy Issue: Weight-Based Discrimination
in the Airline Industry, 62 J. AIR L. & CoM. 203, 204 (1996) ("Obesity and overweight
discrimination has often been described as the last safe area of bigotry and the final
acceptable form of discrimination in America.").
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law.' 4 While several states have enacted discrimination and human rights
laws that specifically address weight discrimination, 15 federal anti-
discrimination laws are silent on the subject. As a result, the obese have
turned to existing federal anti-discrimination laws, such as the ADA, in an
attempt to rectify their situation.
"King-Size Homer" was wrought with common misperceptions about
obesity and the ADA. First, "hyper-obesity" is neither a condition, nor an
actual word outside of The Simpsons. 16 Qualification for protection under the
ADA is not as simple as reaching a pre-determined weight. It is established
on a case-by-case basis 17 and requires a complicated analysis of the
individual's particular condition. Second, studies of children's perceptions of
the obese have shown that many young people would rather be disfigured or
missing a limb than obese, 18 so it is doubtful that anyone but Homer would
seek this condition. Finally, although there is case law on both sides,
Congress and the Supreme Court have yet to directly address whether
14 See Jane Byeff Kom, Fat, 77 B.U.L. REv. 25, 28 (1997) (discussing the
difficulties faced by the obese attempting to combat discrimination).
15 For example, Michigan's Elliot-Larson Civil Rights Act provides that an
employer may not "[l]imit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for
employment in a way that deprives... the employee or applicant of an employment
opportunity... because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight,
or marital status." MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (West 2001) (emphasis added).
See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11 (a) (LexisNexis 2007).
16 See The Simpsons, supra note 1.
17 See, e.g., Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1343-44 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
obesity is not a clearly established disability under the ADA and implying that it may be
found to be disabling on a case-by-case basis).
18 See Stephen A. Richardson et al., Cultural Uniformity in Reaction to Physical
Disabilities, 26 AM. Soc. REv. 241 (1961). A 1957 study of children's perceptions
"showed a consistent preference pattern in evaluating various physical disabilities." Id. at
241. The subjects were ten- to eleven-year-old children from varying social and cultural
backgrounds. Id. at 242. The children were asked to preferentially rank photographs of
the following: a child with no physical handicap, a child with crutches and a leg brace, a
child in a wheelchair, a child missing his left hand, a child with a facial disfigurement,
and an obese child. Id. at 243-45. With alarming consistency, the children ranked obesity
as the least desirable trait, well below the photos with missing limbs and facial
disfigurements. Id. at 243-47.
However, with the ever-increasing rates of obesity among children, there is some
evidence that the younger generation is becoming more accepting of the obese. See Jodi
Kantor, To Report-Card Woes, Add Body-Mass Blues, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 8, 2007,
at 2 (interviewing an obese homecoming queen who does not view her condition as
socially stigmatized), available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/08/
healthscience/web.0108obesity.php (appearing under headline As Obesity Fight Hits
Cafeterias in the US., Many Fear a Note from School).
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obesity, specifically morbid obesity,19 would be considered a disability under
the ADA. Instead, challenges to obesity discrimination in the workplace
under the ADA have, been decided on a fact-specific basis by lower courts, 20
creating a web of confusing and sometimes contradictory jurisprudence.
This Note follows the development of obesity claims, first under state
anti-discrimination laws, then under the ADA since its passage in 1990.21 It
focuses specifically on obesity discrimination claims in employment under
Title I of the ADA,22 where the employer is accused of regarding or
perceiving the obese individual as having a disability. Part II provides an
introduction to the ADA and a roadmap for protection qualification under the
statute. Part III outlines the history of obesity discrimination suits under state
discrimination laws and the ADA, including a brief discussion of obesity
discrimination in the airline industry. Part IV addresses the current state of
,obesity suits brought under the "perceived disability" definition in the
ADA,23 specifically focusing on the most recent case of EEOC v. Watkins
Motor Lines, Inc.24 Finally, Part V discusses the ramifications of including
morbid obesity as a matter of law and suggests that weight-based
discrimination is best addressed through the perceived disability definition.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE ADA
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was intended to expand the
scope of the Rehabilitation Act (RA) of 197325 into the private sector. While
the RA provides protection for handicapped individuals 26  against
19 According to the National Institutes of Health online medical encyclopedia,
morbid obesity refers to patients who are 50-100%, or 100 pounds, above their ideal
weight. See MedlinePlus: Trusted Health Information for You, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/ency/article/007297.htm (Medical Encyclopedia provided by U.S. National
Library of Medicine and National Institutes of Health) (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
20 Cox v. Carrier Sales & Distrib., No. 3:04-CV-527, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49705,
at *35 (E.D. Tenn. Jul. 20, 2006) (noting that, even for obesity "[w]hether a person has a
disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry") (quoting Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999)).
21 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq. (2000).
22 Id.:
23 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000). This definition will be discussed in depth infra
Parts IV-V.
24 EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006).
25 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
26 The term "disability" as it is used in the ADA "is comparable to the definition of
the term 'individual with handicaps' in the section 7(8)(B) of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 .... The use of the term 'disability' instead of 'handicap' . . . represents an
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discrimination by. federal agencies and "any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance," 27 Title I of the ADA protects employees with
disabilities against discrimination by any employer -with fifteen or more
workers. 28 Although these two Acts cover different employers, the
definitions used to analyze their coverage are identical.29 Therefore, obesity
discrimination cases brought under the two Acts are analyzed
,interchangeably. 30
The ADA provides that no "covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to [employment practices]."'31 Discriminatory practices
under the ADA include the failure to provide reasonable accommodations to
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, unless that
"accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of' that
business. 32 In order to qualify for the ADA's protection, the aggrieved party
has the burden of proving that he or she has a disability within the definition
effort... to make use of up-to-date, currently accepted terminology." H.R. REP. No. 101-
485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332.
27 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
28 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000):
(A) In general. The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of
20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent
of such person, except that, for two years following the effective date of this
subchapter, an employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has 25 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such person.
(B) Exceptions. The term "employer" does not include-
(i) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the government of the
United States, or an Indian tribe; or
(ii) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) that is
exempt from taxation under section 50 1(c) of title 26.
29 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 23 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 332 ("The ADA incorporates many of the standards of discrimination set out in
regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ...."). The
definition used in the RA to define a handicapped individual is practically identical to
that used in the ADA to define a person with a disability. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(2000) (outlining the ADA's definition of "disability"), with 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A)
(2000) (defining "individual with a disability" in the RA).
30 See, e.g., Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Because the
standards under both of the acts are largely the same, cases construing one statute are
instructive in construing the other.").
31 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
32 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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of the statute, and that he or she is otherwise qualified for the job. 33 Contrary
to The Simpsons episode, 34 in reality it is very unlikely that Homer would
have qualified as a person with a disability, 3 5 and therefore would not have
been entitled to the reasonable accommodation of working from home. In
fact, qualifying as an individual with a disability has been the largest hurdle
for the obese seeking protection in the courts. 36
A. Disability Under the ADA
The ADA separates "disability" rather broadly into three separate
categories. 37 An individual has a disability for purposes of the ADA if he or
she has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more ... major life activities," 38 has "a record of such an impairment, '39 or
if he or she is "regarded as having such an impairment. '40 All three of these
definitions refer to an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity41 and, therefore, beg the questions: What is an impairment? What is
a major life activity? And, what does it mean to be substantially limited?
Unfortunately, the ADA does not provide the answers. Instead, courts
applying the statute have turned to implementing regulations-in particular
those promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). 42
33 See generally Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58
(4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case of
discrimination before the burden shifts to the covered entity).
34 See supra Part I (discussing the "King-Size Homer" episode of The Simpsons).
35 Homer would likely not be able to show that his obesity substantially limited a
major life activity, and thus would not have qualified as a person with a disability under
the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
36 See infra Part III (discussion of obesity discrimination cases in federal courts).
37 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
38 Id. § 12102(2)(A).
39 Id. § 12102(2)(B).
4 0 Id. § 12102(2)(C).
41 In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that the last two
definitions refer to either having a record of, or being regarded as having, "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
42 In fact, the EEOC has the burden of "issu[ing] regulations to carry out Title I and
[providing] for enforcement of the provisions." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 143
(1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332. Although courts are not required to
follow these regulations, they are widely cited in discrimination cases.
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The EEOC has defined "physical or mental impairment" to mean "[a]ny
physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitor-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. ."43 Courts applying this definition have
made efforts to distinguish recognized disabilities from mere physical
characteristics. 44 This distinction has posed a formidable hurdle to the
recognition of obesity as a disability, as it is often viewed as simply an
undesirable physical trait. Neither the courts nor Congress intended for the
ADA to provide protection against appearance-based discrimination. 45
The ADA does not address obesity as a disability, neither in its text nor
in its legislative history. In fact, only the EEOC has addressed the question of
whether obesity would qualify as an impairment. In the appendix to section
1630, which contains the EEOC's definition of impairment, it states that
"[t]he definition of the term 'impairment' does not include physical
characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height,
weight or muscle tone that are within 'normal' range and are not the result of
a physiological disorder."46 Although on its face this language seems to
43 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2007). The regulation defining impairment for the RA
employs the same language with one small difference-it removes the comma after
"physiological disorder." 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (2006) ("any physiological
disorder or condition"). Though perhaps just a scrivener's error, at least one appellate
judge has pointed out that the effect of this difference is that in the RA, a potential
plaintiff need not prove a physiological cause for a condition, as the word physiological
would only modify disorder. See EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436,
443-44 (6th Cir. 2006) (Gibbons, J., concurring). To date, however, courts have applied
the definitions interchangeably, especially in light of the EEOC's stated intent to adopt
"the definition of the term 'physical or mental impairment' found in the regulations
implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act .... See Equal Employment
Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,740-41 (July 26,
1991) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
44 See, e.g., Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d. 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(h)).
45 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51-52 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303,332.
46 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2007) (emphasis added). See also id. app. § 1630.20)
(noting that "except in rare circumstances, obesity is not considered a disabling
impairment"). No agency has been given express authority to interpret or promulgate
regulations defining the term "disability." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479. Therefore, the EEOC's
regulations are arguably not entitled to much weight. However, courts confronted with
obesity discrimination suits under the ADA have consistently cited to these regulations as
indications of congressional intent. See Andrews, 104 F.3d at 808; Cook v. R.I. Dep't of
Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1993); Smaw v. Va. Dep't
of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1474-75 (E.D. Va. 1994).
17672007]
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imply that weight which is beyond the "normal range," such as morbid
obesity, may qualify as an impairment, courts have cited this definition as
support for a more narrow reading of impairment in the obesity context.47
Further, plaintiffs attempting to state a case under the ADA must show
that their impairment "substantially limits one or moreof [their] major life
activities.' '48 This requirement really requires two findings: 1) a substantial
limitation 2) of a major life activity.49 Major life activities include basic
functions such as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. ' 50 If the
individual's condition qualifies as an "impairment," and it affects a major life
activity, the court must determine whether its effect is substantial. 51
The EEOC regulations define "substantially limits" as either "[u]nable to
perform a major life activity that the average person... can perform," 52 or
"[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which
[the] individual can perform a particular major life activity [compared to the
average person]. ' '53 The Supreme Court has interpreted the major life activity
requirement strictly in at least two instances: performing manual tasks and
working.
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,54 the
Supreme Court held that to be substantially limited in the major life activity
of performing manual tasks, "an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives."'55 The Court went on to note
that if Congress had intended to qualify everyone that' was precluded from
performing some isolated, unimportant manual task as having a disability,
47 See, e.g., Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d at 442 (holding that morbid obesity,
without a physiological cause, is not an impairment); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129
F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997). Neither of these cases considered whether morbid obesity,
as a matter of law, had a physiological cause. Instead, they looked to the individual
plaintiffs to carry that burden.
48 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
49 See Smaw, 862 F. Supp. at 1472 ("Smaw must show that she was discriminated
against because she had, or was regarded by her employer as having, (1) a physical or
mental impairment; (2) that limits a major life activity; and (3) the limitation is
substantial.").
50 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007).
51 See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523 (1998).
52 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2007).
53 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2007).
54 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
55 Id. at 198.
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the number of Americans with disabilities referred to in the ADA's
enactment5 6 would have been much higher. 57
A restrictive reading has also been given to the major life- activity of
working, where the Supreme Court has held that the individual's impairment
must preclude or substantially limit his ability to perform a "class of
employment," as opposed to one particular job.58 So, while there are a host
of activities that may qualify as major life activities, the real hurdle appears
to be whether that activity is substantially limited by the impairment.
For an individual to qualify as a person with a disability under the first
prong of the ADA's definition, then, he or she has the burden of proving that
he: 1) has an impairment; 2) that affects a major life activity; and 3) that the
effect of that impairment is substantial. 59 Similarly, under the second prong
of the ADA's definition, 60 the individual is considered to- have a disability
only if he or she has a record of such an impairment that has substantially
limited a major life activity. 61 In other words, he must show that he has
suffered from such an impairment in the past. The third prong, and the focus
of this Note, departs somewhat from the above analysis.
Often referred to as either the "regarded as" or "perceived disability"
prong,62 the ADA's third definition of disability protects those employees or
potential employees who have been "regarded as having such an
impairment. '63 The EEOC has interpreted this definition to mean:
56 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000) ("[S]ome 43,000,000 Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a
whole is growing older.").
57 Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197.
58 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999). In fact, the Court held
that "[t]o be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be
precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a peculiar job of choice."
Id. In other words, an individual is not substantially limited in the major life activity of
working if he cannot perform the job at issue. He is only substantially limited if he could
not perform an entire class of jobs. Id.
59 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (defining "disability" as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual").
60 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2000) (qualifying an individual as a person with a
disability if they have a record of such an impairment).
61 Although there appears to be little litigation under this definition, the EEOC
regulations specify that having a record of an impairment "means [the person] has a
history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2007).
62 See, e.g., Amy M. Frisk & Charles B. Hemicz, Obesity As a Disability: An Actual
or Perceived Problem?, ARMY LAW., May 1996, at 3, 13-19.
63 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000).
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(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit
major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such
limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment;
or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h) (1) or (2) of this
section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting
impairment. 64
The first two definitions require a finding of an impairment, the third
does not. The Supreme Court found in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.6 5 that
there were only two ways that an individual could fall within the "regarded
as" definition: "(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a
physical impairment that substantially limits [a major life activity], or (2) a
covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting impairment
substantially limits [a major life activity]. ' '66 The first Sutton definition seems
to encompass subsection (3) of the EEOC's regulation above, and would not
require the finding of an actual impairment.67 The Court went on to cite the
EEOC's regulation which acknowledged that, in creating this definition,
Congress intended to protect against the "'myths, fears and stereotypes'
associated with disabilities."'68
Under the "regarded as" prong, the aggrieved individual need not satisfy
the requirements for proving a disability as under the first two definitions.
Instead, they are protected by the ADA against discrimination by employers
who believe their condition to be disabling, when in fact it is not.69 In
passing the ADA, Congress acknowledged that "[t]his third prong is
particularly important for individuals with stigmatic conditions that are
viewed as physical impairments but do not in fact result in a substantial
limitation of a major life activity."' 70 In other words, its purpose is to protect
individuals against "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability
64 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)-(3) (2007).
65 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
66 ld. at 489.
67 This is in line with Congress's intent to include "not only those who are actually
physically impaired but also those who are regarded as impaired .... H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332.
68 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490 (citing 29 C.F.R. § app. 1630.2(1)).
69 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
70 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303,332.
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and diseases [that] are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that
flow from actual impairment."'71
It is under this third prong of the ADA's definition of disability that
obesity discrimination claims appear to have had the most success in
achieving recognition. Although the analysis itself proceeds on a case-by-
case basis, courts have been very reluctant to recognize obesity as an actual
impairment on its own-even though recognizing it would still require the
obese individual to prove that they were "otherwise qualified" 72-and more
sympathetic to claims brought under the perceived disability definition. 73
B. Even Disabled Individuals Must be Qualified for the Job
The ADA provides protection to a "qualified individual with a disability"
against workplace discrimination. 74 Therefore, not only must the individual
prove that he has a disability under one of the three definitions above, but he
must also show that he is otherwise qualified for the position from which he
has been denied or wrongfully terminated. 75 Only then will the ADA's
protection apply.
A qualified individual with a disability is "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." '76
The ADA itself does little to illuminate the meaning of "essential functions."
EEOC regulations provide some guidance, noting that it "does not include
the marginal functions of the position."'77 Case law, however, has made it
clear that the courts will not use the ADA to protect individuals with
71 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 332. See also Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277-80
(1987) (discussing Congress's intent in amending the RA language to include protection
from discrimination and misperceptions).
72 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
73 See infra Part III.
74 42 U.S.C. § 121 12(b)(5)(A) (2000).
75 In addition to showing that he or she is a person with a disability under the
definition and is qualified with or without reasonable accommodation, a prima facie case
of discrimination under the ADA requires additional showings that the plaintiff was
subject to adverse employment action as the sole result of his disability. This final
requirement can be shown indirectly if the plaintiff was either replaced by a person
without a disability or treated less favorably than other nondisabled employees.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
76 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
77 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2007).
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disabilities who are not, or who are no longer, qualified for the job they hope
to get or are holding. 78
For example, Robert McDonald was released from his position as a
correctional officer when he could no longer fulfill the physical demands of
his job.79 At the time he began his employment, he weighed 400 pounds.80
To accommodate his size, the department ordered special uniforms and
chairs, and accorded him temporary light duty.81 After suffering congestive
heart failure, McDonald's doctor restricted, him from walking more than one
hundred feet, standing more than fifteen minutes, stepping, and lifting objects
that required two hands. 82 Shortly thereafter, McDonald was released from
his duties due to the department's inability to accommodate his condition.83
He brought suit under the ADA claiming "that he suffered from
multiple ... disabilities.., and that he required and requested reasonable
accommodations which defendant refused to provide. '84 The department
admitted that McDonald had a disability within the definition; instead it
argued that he was not otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions
of his position.85 The court agreed. The essential functions of the position
required McDonald to be responsible for safety, stand for long periods of
time, and respond quickly to emergencies. 86 It was McDonald's burden to
prove that a certain accommodation would be reasonable, and that given the
accommodation, he could perform the essential functions of the job. 87
McDonald did not meet this burden. 88 Therefore, although McDonald had a
disability, he was not qualified for the position and, therefore, not protected
by the ADA.89
McDonald's situation also illuminates the limits of reasonable
accommodations. An assessment of an individual's ability to perform the
essential functions of the position assumes that the employer can make
78 See, e.g., McDonald v. Dep't of Corr., 880 F. Supp. 1416, 1423-24 (D. Kan.
1995).
79 Id.
80Id. at 1419.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 McDonald, 880 F. Supp. at 1421.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1422.
86 Id. at 1419.
87 Id. at 1423.
88 McDonald 880 F. Supp. at 1424.
89 Id. at 1423.
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reasonable accommodations to assist that individual. 90 A reasonable
accommodation is one that does not impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business.91 If the individual with a disability can perform the
essential functions of the job only at significant expense and hardship to the
business, 92 he is not qualified for the job and will not receive the ADA's
protection.93
Discrimination aside, qualification itself under the ADA poses a
substantial obstacle for the obese seeking its protection. Not only must a
potential plaintiff show that he has an impairment-either an actual
impairment or perceived impairment 94-but he must also show that the
impairment substantially limited, or was regarded as substantially limiting,
one of his major life activities. 95 Finally, he must prove that he is qualified
for the job by showing that he could perform the essential functions of the
position with or without reasonable accommodations. 96 In fact, most of the
analysis of obesity under the ADA has focused on the qualification
standards. 97 If a plaintiff manages to satisfy all of the above, the process of
proving discriminatory practices requires only a showing that the plaintiff
was fired or denied employment because of his or her disability.98
90 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (defining qualified individual with a disability as
one who can perform the essential functions of the job "with or without reasonable
accommodation"). His ability to perform, then, is assessed in light of any
accommodations he may need.
91 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). The term "undue hardship" is defined as an
action that imposes "significant difficulty or expense" on the business. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111 (10)(A) (2000).
92 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(10)(A) (2000).
93 Again, the ADA only provides protection for a qualified individual with a
disability. An individual is only qualified if they can perform the essential functions of
the job with reasonable accommodations. The reasoning, then, is that if the
accommodations needed are not reasonable, because they impose an undue hardship on
the business, the individual is not qualified, and the ADA does not apply. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102 etseq. (2000).
94 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
95 Id.
96 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
97 See, e.g., Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997); Tudyman v. United
Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
98 See generally Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (discussing the
burdens of proof for plaintiffs and employers in ADA discrimination suits).
[A] plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden
then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment action. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of
intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove disparate
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III. THE CONFUSED HISTORY OF OBESITY SUITS UNDER THE ADA
Due to the lack of specific federal protection, the ADA and the RA have
been the most common vehicles used by the obese to combat discrimination
in the workplace. 99 The success of these suits seems to depend, largely, on
which definition of "disability" the plaintiff is attempting to prove. The
outcome of earlier state cases on obesity discrimination brought under the
state disability definitions depended upon how broad the state read its
definition of disability.100 Later cases, however, where the focus was on
whether the condition was perceived as disabling, were more successful. 0 1
Although there is case law on both sides, it appears that obesity suits brought
under the perceived disability definition have had the most success, and
attempts to prove that obesity itself is a disability have been met with more
skepticism. 102
A. State Cases Discussing Obesity as a Disability
One of the earliest cases discussing obesity as a disability, Greene v.
Union Pacific Railroad10 3 found that the plaintiffs condition did not qualify
as a disability because it was "not an immutable condition such as blindness
or lameness." 10 4 Greene was denied a transfer into a fireman position
because of his morbid obesity. 105 The court found that his condition was not
a disability because his weight "seemed to vary according to the motivation
that he had for controlling [it]. ' ' 10 6 Greene was brought under the auspices of
treatment by. . . offering evidence demonstrating that the employer's explanation is
pretextual.
Id. at 49 n.3 (citations omitted).
99 See Carol R. Buxton, Obesity and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 BARRY
L. REv. 109, 109-14 (2003).
100 William C. Taussig, Note, Weighing in Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v.
Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the
Recognition of Obesity as a Disability Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 35 B.C. L. REv. 927, 941-45 (1994).
101 See, e.g., Cook v. R.I. Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d
17 (lst Cir. 1993).
102 Compare Cook, 10 F.3d at 17 (holding that the plaintiff was perceived as a
person with a disability under the Act), with Andrews, 104 F.3d at 803 (holding that the
plaintiffs did not prove that their obesity was a disability).
103 Greene v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
104 Id. at 5.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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Washington State's anti-discrimination laws. 10 7 The assumption that
immutability is a necessary attribute of a disability was a common defense to
state law obesity disability claims but has been largely rejected in ADA and
RA suits. 108
New York confronted and dismissed the immutability argument in
McDermott v. Xerox, 10 9 where it noted that the state statute 10 protected all
individuals with disabilities, "not just those with hopeless conditions."'''
When the complainant, Ms. McDermott, was denied a job as a systems
consultant on the basis of her weight alone, 1 2 the court determined that her
obesity was an actual disability under New York law 113 and granted her
relief.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, however, has found that "the mere
assertion that one is overweight or obese is not alone adequate to make a
[claim of disability]." 1 4 In Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, Krein,
107 Id.
108 See Cook, 10 F.3d at 23 (holding that the assertion that mutable traits are not
impairments under the RA "is as insubstantial as a pitchman's promise"). In fact, there is
a large amount of scientific research tending to prove that once a person becomes
morbidly obese, his body composition changes, and it becomes extremely difficult for
them to lose and to keep off the weight. See Kuss, supra note 10, at 570 (arguing that a
high "set point" weight, based on a theory which analyzes "[t]he ability of humans to
maintain remarkably stable body core temperatures and ... glucose . . . despite extreme
variations in environmental conditions," could explain an obese individual's inability to
lose weight).
109 McDermott v. Xerox Co., 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985).
110 This case was brought under New York State's Human Rights Law, which at the
time defined disability as "a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions with [sic] prevents the exercise of a
normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory
diagnostic techniques ..." Id. at 696.
1'1 McDermott, 480 N.E.2d at 698.
112 Id. at 696.
113 The court noted that the state law in this case had a much broader definition of
disability than the ADA or RA in that it provided coverage for "medical impairments" in
addition to physical and mental impairments. Id. at 698. Ms. McDermott's obesity was a
medical impairment. Id.
114 Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 796 (N.D. 1987). Like
Greene v. Union Pacific, this case was brought under state discrimination law. The state
law in question, however, provides that "[i]t is a discriminatory practice for an employer
to fail or refuse to make reasonable accommodations for an otherwise qualified person
with a physical or mental disability...." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2006).
Moreover, the definition of disability provided in the North Dakota code is identical to
the federal definitions in the ADA and RA. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(5)
("'Disability' means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
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the plaintiff, weighed over three hundred pounds and claimed that she was
discharged because of her obesity.115 The court did not dismiss the
possibility that obesity could be a disability when it "significantly impair[ed]
a person's abilities;" 1 6 however, under these particular facts, the plaintiff did
not show that her weight impacted or limited her in any way, or that her
employer viewed her as such. 117 Had this claim with these same facts been
brought under the ADA, as opposed to state law, the result would have likely
been the same, as the plaintiff failed to show that her weight substantially
limited a major life activity. "18
California has also determined that a showing of obesity alone does not
automatically qualify a person as disabled.119 In Cassista v. Community
Foods, Toni Cassista was five feet, four inches tall and weighed three
hundred and five pounds. 120 She went to an interview for a position at
Community Foods in which the employer asked her if she had any physical
limitations, and she replied that she did not. 121 She was not hired for the
position, but when another position opened up several weeks later, she
contacted the store's personnel coordinator to request that she be considered
again for the position.122 Her application was submitted, and, again, she was
not offered the job.123 When she inquired as to the reason, the personnel
coordinator informed her that there was a concern that she could not
physically handle the work because of her weight. 124
Cassista filed suit under California's Fair Employment and Housing
Act, 125 alleging discrimination because she was perceived as having a
more major life activities, a record of this impairment, or being regarded as having this
impairment.").
115 Krein, 415 N.W.2d at 793.
116 Id. at 796.
'17 Id.
118 For instance, the Eighth Circuit found that the ADA does not provide protection
where the plaintiff fails to show a substantial limitation with regard to a major life
activity. Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., 432 F.3d 839, 849 (8th Cir. 2005).
119 Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1153-54 (Cal. 1993).
120Id. at 1144.
121 Id. at 1145.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 I.
125 CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12900 et seq. (West 2006). Cassista brought suit under
§ 12921, which prohibits employment discrimination based on physical or mental
disabilities. Id. at § 12921. California defines disability in a virtually identical manner to
the ADA and RA. Compare CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 12926(k) (West 2006), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)'(2000).
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disability by the employer. 126 The California Court of Appeals sympathized
with Cassista's claim and held that "Community Foods considered Cassista's
weight to be a physical handicap as that term [was] defined under the
FEHA."'127 On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, however,
Cassista's luck ran out. The court held that "it is not enough to show that an
employer's decision is based on the perception that an applicant is
disqualified by his or her weight. The applicant must be 'regarded as having
or having had' a condition 'described in paragraph (1) or (2).' ' 128 In other
words, the court found that Cassista must have been regarded as having a
physiological disease or disorder that affected a bodily system. 129 Translated
to the words of the ADA, the California court essentially held that
Community Foods had to have regarded Cassista's obesity as having a
physiological cause in order for it to qualify under the definition of disability.
Because she did not have medical testimony tending to prove a "cause" for
her obesity, she was not considered to have a disability.130 This reasoning
has, in fact, gained strength and support in the federal circuit courts.13 1
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division, however, did not
require this complex factual finding when it held that Joe Gimello had been
discriminated against by his employer, Agency Rent-A-Car, because of his
obesity.132 When Gimello began his employment with Agency, he stated his
weight on his application as 225 pounds. 133 Five years later, after years of
being a record-breaking employee, 134 Gimello's weight had reached 324
pounds, and he was fired. 135 Testimony made it clear that his employer had
been very uncomfortable with his weight. 136 Gimello brought suit claiming
126 Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
127 Id. at 105.
128 Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1153-54.
131 See, for example, EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir.
2006), which will be discussed in depth infra Part fV.
132 Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 273 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991).
133 Id. at 266.
134 Id. at 266-67. During his years at Agency, Gimello consistently won accolades
for his record sales of "Deductible Protection Coverage." Normal sales rates averaged
around 50%. Gimello consistently exceeded performance expectations. Id. at 266. His
success was rewarded with numerous raises, promotions, and bonuses. Id.
135 Id. at 268-69.
136 In fact, one of his superiors had testified that the high employee turnover rate at
Gimello's office was "because of his size and appearance." Id. at 269. His constant
comments about Gimello's weight led to the administrative law judge's finding that "his
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both that his obesity was a disability and that he was perceived as having a
disability by his employer. The court found that "he was fired because of this
physical condition which his supervisors perceived as a defect and which did
not in fact disqualify him in any proven sense . ,,137 Under New Jersey's
broad definition of "disability,"'138 the court found that obesity actually
qualified as a disability. 139 The court did not, however, think that the
"perceived disability" question was critical to their decision because
Gimello's obesity was demonstrated by uncontested medical evidence
showing that his condition had causes other than sloth and overeating.140
Gimello succeeded in proving that his obesity was in fact a physiological
condition and therefore met the burden of proving it was a disability within
the statutory definition.
Without underestimating the importance of the state statutory language,
the success of obesity discrimination claims brought under state law has
depended largely on the approach that the state court has taken to the claim.
Where the court begins by noting that the plaintiff was denied a position for
which he was otherwise qualified solely because of his weight, the plaintiff is
likely to succeed because, regardless of whether his obesity was an actual
disability, it was disabling in that context. 141 As the cases below show, this
approach seems to mirror federal cases brought under the "perceived
disability" definition. On the other hand, where the state court focuses on the
concern with complainant's weight was the primary reason for his subsequent actions to
effectuate the termination of complainant's employment." Id. at 271.
137 Id. at 273.
138 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5q (West Supp. 2007). The New Jersey statute defines
disability in the following manner:
"Disability" means physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement
which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy and other
seizure disorders, and which shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of
paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment,
deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical
reliance on a service or guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or
device, or any mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from
anatomical, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents
the normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically
or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.
Disability shall also mean AIDS or HIV infection.
Id. At the time of the Gimello decision, the New Jersey statute contained the term
"handicap" rather than "disability." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5q (West 1990); Gimello, 594
A.2d at 274.
139 Gimello, 594 A.2d at 276.
140 Id. at 278.
141 See id. at 273.
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medical aspects of obesity, as opposed to its social effects, and requires the
plaintiff to show that the obesity has a physiological cause aside from the
condition itself,142 success has been more elusive.
B. Federal Cases Where Obesity Was Not a Disability
William Tudyman was a flight attendant for United Airlines. 143
Unfortunately, he was fifteen pounds over the maximum weight established
for his height by United Airlines' weight program for flight attendants and
was released from his position. 144 Tudyman was not overweight in the
conventional sense. Indeed, his weight was the result of avid bodybuilding,
and actually resulted in a lower than normal percentage of body fat. 145
Nonetheless, he was terminated when he reached the maximum allowable
weight. 146 Tudyman brought suit under section 504 of the RA,147 alleging
that he was discriminated against because United regarded him as having a
disability. In its defense, United argued that it did not regard Tudyman as
having a disability, but rather it viewed him as simply not meeting its weight
requirements. 148 The court agreed, noting section 504's "Catch 22" aspect,
requiring that even under the perceived disability definition, the plaintiff
must show he has an impairment that substantially limited a major life
activity. 149 According to the Court, failure to qualify for a single job did not
substantially limit Tudyman's major life activity of working. 150 The court
held that "[fjor the same reason that the failure to qualify for a single job
does not constitute a limitation on a major life activity, refusal to hire
someone for a single job does not in and of itself constitute perceiving the
plaintiff as a handicapped individual."' 5'1 In other words, Tudyman did not
meet the burden of proving that he had a disability.
142 See Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 1993).
143 Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 741 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
144 Id. at 740-41.
145 Id. at 741. United Airlines' policy was "motivated by a desire to assure the neat
and pleasing appearance of its flight attendants." Id.
146 Id.
147 Because United Airlines was receiving some federal monies, the RA applied.
The standards used in determining a violation of this section are the same as those
applied under Title 1 of the ADA. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000).
148 Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 744 ("Defendant argues that plaintiff has no such
limitation or impairment and that it does not so regard plaintiff. It only regards plaintiff as
not meeting the weight restriction.").
149 Id.
150 Id. at 746.
151 Id.
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In Torcasio v. Murray, a prisoner filed suit under the RA claiming that
he was due reasonable accommodation because it was "clearly established"
that morbid obesity qualified as a disability under the Act.152 The Fourth
Circuit rejected his claim on two fronts. Not only was it not "clearly
established" that the RA applied to state prisons, but it was also not "clearly
established" that morbid obesity was a disability under the Act. 153 In both
Torcasio,and Tudyman, the plaintiffs failed to prove that their obesity was an
actual impairment under the Acts 154 and were thus denied statutory
protection.
In 1997, seventy-six law enforcement officers brought suit against the
State of Ohio alleging that they were discriminated against when they could
not meet the weight requirement set for their particular jobs.155 .Citing the
EEOC's regulations defining "a person who is regarded as having such an
impairment,"' 156 the Sixth Circuit noted that to set forth a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA or RA, "[the] plaintiffs must allege either that
they are or are perceived to be handicapped within the definitions of each of
the acts . "... . 157 The court went on to hold that the officers did not meet the
burden of showing that their weight was an impairment. 158 They based this
finding onthe EEOC's guideline stating that "weight or muscle tone that are
within 'normal' range and are not the result of a physiological disorder" are
not impairments. 159 In fact, a strict reading of this guideline would seem to
imply that weight that is not "within the normal range," such as clinical
obesity, or evidence that the weight condition was the result of a
152 Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1342 (4th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff was five
feet, seven inches tall and weighed 460 pounds. Id. Although the prison did make some
accommodations for his size, he claimed that its denial of his request for a larger cell,
wider entrances to showers, and alternative outdoor recreational activities was a violation
of the RA. Id.
153 Id. at 1343-44.
154 The plaintiff in Torcasio did not make a fact-based attempt to prove that his
impairment substantially limited a major life activity, but instead claimed that morbid
obesity was a qualified disability as a matter of law. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1342. Likewise,
the plaintiff in Tudyman did not make a showing that his employer regarded his weight as
a disability within the definition. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746 ("Plaintiff has no
physical impairment and is not substantially limited in any major life activity. Nor does
defendant perceive plaintiff to have a physical impairment which limits his activities.").
155 Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 805 (6th Cir. 1997).
156 Id. at 807.
157 Id. The plaintiffs, then, had to show that they had, or were perceived to have, an
impairment that substantially limited them in a recognized major life activity. Id.
158 Id. at 808.
159 29 C.F.R. app § 1630.2(h) (2007).
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physiological disorder, would qualify as an impairment. 160 Nonetheless, the
Sixth Circuit did not rule out that morbid obesity could be an impairment,
although it emphasized that the plaintiff has the burden of offering evidence
that the obesity was caused by a physiological condition. 16 1
Obesity has not been dismissed as a disability per se in the federal courts.
Instead, courts have been strict in requiring that each individual plaintiff
show that his or her obesity was an impairment that substantially- limited a
major life activity, or was regarded as such. Where this factual showing has
been met, courts have been more receptive to classifying obesity as a
disability.
C. Federal Cases Where Obesity Was a Disability
The First Circuit was the first federal appellate court to recognize morbid
obesity as a perceived disability. 162 In Cook v. Rhode Island, the plaintiff
prevailed under the perceived disability prong of the RA when the court held
that her employer regarded her obesity as substantially limiting her in the
major life activity of working. 163
Bonnie Cook was employed as an institutional attendant for the mentally
handicapped at the Ladd Center from 1978 to 1980 and again from 1981 to
1986.164 Her record was "spotless," and she departed both times
voluntarily. 165 In 1988, Cook reapplied for an identical position. 166 At that
time, "she stood 5'2" tall and- weighed over 320 pounds."' 67 The nurse who
conducted her routine, pre-hire physical noted that Cook was morbidly
obese, but found no limitations that would affect her ability to do her job.16 8
160 The regulation in question attempts to distinguish between actual impairments
and mere physical characteristics. In so doing, it points out that eye color and normal
weight are not impairments and are not the result of a physiological disorder. Common
cannons of interpretation would suggest that by stating that "normal weight" is not an
impairment, the implication is that "abnormal" weight may be an impairment.
161 Andrews, 104 F.3d at 809 (citing Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health,
Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1993)).
162 Taussig, supra note 100, at 928 (noting that in 1993, the First Circuit "became
the first United States Court of Appeals to acknowledge morbid obesity as a disability
under federal disability law").
163 Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 20-21
(lst Cir. 1993).
164 Id. at 20.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Cook, 10 F.3d at 20-21.
2007]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Notwithstanding the nurse's finding, the Department of Mental Health,
Retardation, and Hospitals (MHRH), who ran the Ladd Center, disagreed. 169
MHRH "claimed that Cook's morbid obesity compromised her ability to
evacuate patients" in an emergency 170 and "put her at greater risk of
developing serious ailments."' 71 They refused to rehire Cook.172 Cook filed
suit in federal court, alleging discrimination in violation of section 504 of the
RA. 17 3 She claimed that she was fully qualified and able to perform the job,
but that MHRH regarded her as physically impaired because of her
obesity.174 The jury agreed, and the case was appealed to the First Circuit.175
In what can only be described as a victory for the obese, the First Circuit
affirmed the jury's verdict and held that the jury "could plausibly have found
that [Cook] had a physical impairment."'176 Moreover, the court dispelled the
argument that mutable conditions cannot be impairments protected by the
ADA and the RA, 177 and dismissed the claim that, because it may be the
result of voluntary conduct, morbid obesity is not covered by the Act. 178 In
fact, in addressing the voluntariness argument, the court actually compared
obesity to "alcoholism, AIDS, diabetes, [and] cancer resulting from
smoking,"' 179 noting that these conditions are undoubtedly caused by
voluntary conduct, but that the Act nonetheless indisputably covers them. ' 80
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (providing in part that "[n]o otherwise qualified
individual.., shall, solely by reason of her.., disability, .., be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
174 Cook, 10 F.3d at 22.
175 Id. at 21. The trial court reserved decision, and instead submitted the case on
special interrogatories. "The jury answered the interrogatories favorably to plaintiff and,
by means of the accompanying general verdict, awarded her $100,000 in compensatory
damages." Id. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict. Id.
176 Id. at 23.
177 Id. at 24. "Mutability is nowhere mentioned in the statute or regulations, and we
see little reason to postulate it as an automatic disqualifier under section 504. It seems to
us, instead, that mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the
limitation flowing from a given impairment." Id. at 23 n.7.
178 Id. at 24 ("[V]oluntariness, like mutability, is relevant only in determining
whether a condition has a substantially limiting effect.").
179 1d. at 24.
180 Cook, 10 F.3d at 24.
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Cook, then, passed the hurdle of showing that her obesity was an
impairment under the regulatory definition.'81 Additionally, statements made
by her employer made it clear that he regarded her as substantially limited in
the major life activity of working. 182 Therefore, because the jury could
reasonably have found that she had a disability under the statute and she
showed that she was "otherwise qualified" for the job, 83 the Act applied and
she was protected from discrimination based on her disability.
This victory, however, is tempered somewhat by the court's heavy
reliance on the fact that Cook presented substantial medical testimony that
morbid obesity "is a physiological disorder involving a dysfunction of both
the metabolic system and the neurological appetite-suppressing signal
system .... " 184 In other words, the decision did not accept obesity as an
impairment as a matter of law, but instead relied on Cook's individual
situation and thus limited the decision to the facts of her case. 185
As a side note, the EEOC filed an important brief as amicus curiae in the
Cook decision, in which it supported Cook's claim by arguing that morbid
obesity should be an actual disability under the ADA. 186 The brief argued
that, although analysis should continue on a case-by-case basis, "obesity may
be a disability under the [Act] if it constitutes an impairment and if it is of
such duration that it substantially limits a major life activity or is regarded as
so doing."' 8 7 Some viewed this brief as a switch in the EEOC's classification
of obesity. 188 In support of this view, a more recent clarification of the term
disability by the EEOC reinforces the argument that, while being overweight
alone is generally not an impairment, severe or morbid obesity "is clearly an
impairment."'189 The EEOC's position is important in that it represents the
181 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2) (2006).
182 Cook, 10 F.3d at 25 ("Dr. O'Brien believed [Cook's] limitations foreclosed a
broad range of employment options in the health care industry, including positions such
as community living aide, nursing home aide, hospital aide, and home health care aide.").
183 Id. at 28.
184 Id. at 23.
185 Id. at 26.
186 See Buxton, supra note 99, at 119.
187 Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 11, Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health,
Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1093), 1993 WL 13625007;
see also Frisk, supra note 62, at 17.
188 Buxton, supra note 99, at 119 (arguing that the EEOC reversed its opinion
"without warning").
189 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE MANUAL
add. § 902, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html (under Section 902.2(c)(5)(ii))
(last modified on Feb. 1, 2000) (emphasis added).
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first, and only, federal agency recognition of morbid obesity as a qualifying
impairment.
In EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, a federal court again found that obesity
qualified under the ADA as a disability on a fact-specific basis.' 90 Like in
Cook, the plaintiff in Texas Bus Lines succeeded under the perceived
definition of disability. 191 Moreover, this case was brought by the EEOC on
the complainant's behalf, reinforcing the agency's support of including
morbid obesity as a disability protected by the ADA. 192
Arazella Manuel applied for employment with Texas Bus Lines in 1994
for a position that would require her to drive a passenger van between several
hotels and the airport. 193 At 5'4" and 345 pounds, Manuel was morbidly
obese. 194 She was interviewed, her references were checked, and she
successfully passed a road test. 195 She was then required to undergo a
physical examination, per Department of Transportation regulations. 196 The
examining physician declared her to be "disqualified" and refused to issue
her the required certificate) 97 He based his refusal on his belief that she
"would not be able to move swiftly in the event of an accident."'198 Based on
the doctor's findings, Texas Bus Lines refused to hire Manuel, claiming she
was uninsurable.199
The EEOC filed suit on Manuel's behalf, arguing that "Texas Bus Lines'
refusal to hire Manuel constitute[d] a violation of the [ADA]" since its
refusal was based on the perception that her obesity was a disability.200 The
court was quick to pass Manuel through the threshold burdens of proving that
she had a disability and was "otherwise qualified" for the position.
Addressing the issue of her obesity as a disability, the court cited the EEOC
regulations for "being regarded as having such an impairment" 20 1 and found
that an individual who is denied a job based on stereotypes of disabilities
would be covered under the "regarded as" definition regardless of whether
that individual's condition would meet the burden under the first or second
190 EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
191 Id. at 974.
192 Id. at 965.
193 Id. at 967.
194 Id. at 967 & n.1.
195 Id. at 967.
196 Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 967.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 967-68.
200 Id. at 968.
201 Id. at 974 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)).
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definitions. 20 2 In other words, the EEOC was not required to show that
Manuel's obesity was an actual impairment, but only that the employment
decision was made "because of a perception of disability based on 'myth,
fear or stereotype.' 203 As for showing that Manuel was "otherwise
qualified" for the job, the court found that "the only obstacle to the required
... certification was both Texas Bus Lines and [the doctor's] perceived and
mistaken belief that Manuel was disabled as a result of her obesity. 20 4
Manuel met all other qualifications. 20 5
It is worth noting that the EEOC did not argue in Texas Bus Lines that
morbid obesity was an actual disability. Rather, it simply argued that Manuel
had been perceived as disabled. 206 In holding that she had been perceived as
disabled, the court was careful to spell out that "courts as well as the ADA
have consistently rejected obesity as a disability protected by the ADA. 207
It seems that the Ninth Circuit, however, would disagree that obesity has
been "consistently" rejected as a protected disability. In Gaddis v. Oregon
the court based its opinion on the assumption that morbid obesity was a
disability under the ADA.20 8 The opinion opened by stating that the plaintiff
suffered from "morbid obesity, a disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990."209 Interestingly, the court does not cite case law for
this proposition, nor is there any indication that the plaintiff presented
evidence tending to prove he had a disability under the definition. Instead, it
cites to the ADA itself-which does not mention obesity.210
The Ninth Circuit appears to be an anomaly in accepting the plaintiffs
morbid obesity as a disability without a particularized factual finding of a
physiological cause for the obesity, or that the employer regarded the
202 Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 975 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987) ("Such an impairment might not diminish a person's physical
or mental capacities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to
work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment.")). The Sixth
Circuit has interpreted this definition to require a finding of an actual impairment. See
discussion of EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, infra Part IV.
203 Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 975.
204 Id. at 971.
205 Id.
206 See, e.g., Kari Homer, Comment, A Growing Problem: Why the Federal
Government Needs to Shoulder the Burden in Protecting Workers from Weight
Discrimination, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 589, 599 (2005).
207 Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 975 (citing Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340,
1354 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that obesity alone is not a disability) (emphasis added)).
208 Gaddis v. Oregon, 21 F. App'x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished).
209 Id.
210 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12122.3 (2000)).
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plaintiff as having a disability. Of the cases in which obesity has been
protected under the ADA, the majority of successful plaintiffs have either
shown that their own obesity has a physiological cause, 211 or that they were
regarded by their employer as substantially limited in a major life activity
due to their obesity.2 12
The qualified success of obesity discrimination suits in the federal courts
raises questions as to the repercussions of classifying morbid obesity as a
disability. To date, aside from the Ninth Circuit,213 no court has actually
declared morbid obesity to be a disability. Instead, aggrieved individuals
have prevailed under the perceived disability prong of the definition. In Part
V, this Note will argue that this approach strikes the appropriate balance
between allowing recovery for discrimination based on a perceived disability
and holding back the flood of suits that could arise if obesity were declared
an actual disability.214
D. Obesity and the Air Carrier Access Act
A rampant misperception about the repercussions of classifying obesity
as a disability is the idea that the obese would then be given first-class airline
seats to accommodate their size, or in the alternative, that they would be
guaranteed an empty seat next to them on a full flight while normal-sized
patrons are squeezed in three to a row. In fact, airlines are not governed by
the ADA. "[A]irlines were specifically excluded from the application of the
ADA because Congress had already passed legislation to deal with
handicapped airline travelers: the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986
(ACAA). ' '2 15 Like the ADA, the ACAA seeks to prevent discrimination
against individuals with disabilities and defines disability identically to the
ADA and the RA.2 16 Therefore, in order to be protected by the ACAA, the
complaining individual must show that he or she has a disability, a
formidable hurdle for the obese.
The airlines face their own dilemma in trying to accommodate both their
obese passengers and average-sized passengers. With America's ever-
expanding waistline, they have a difficult task in keeping all of their
customers happy. To achieve this balance, many airlines rationalize that
211 See, e.g., Cook v. v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
212 See, e.g., EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
213 Gaddis, 21 F. App'x. at 642.
214 The phrase "actual disability" used here refers to prong (a) of the ADA's
definition of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
215 Lynch, supra note 13, at 233.
216 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a) (2000).
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"when purchasing a seat, passengers actually purchase two products:
transport to a destination and a space to occupy during the journey. '' 217 In
line with this reasoning, airlines have instituted a policy that requires the
obese to purchase two seats. Southwest Airlines, for instance, requires its
obese passengers to purchase two seats in advance. 218 Should the flight take
off with empty seats, the cost of the second seat will be refunded.219 The
definitive gauge is not passengers' actual weight, but whether they can put
down the armrest between themselves and the passenger next to them.220
This policy applies regardless of whether the passenger is obese, pregnant, or
simply broad-shouldered. 221 Although other airlines have similar policies,
Southwest has been criticized because of its increased vigilance in enforcing
its policy.222 Even Jay Leno poked fun at the policy, saying, "Boy, Southwest
is cracking down on overweight passengers. Now any fat people standing in
front of the terminal for more than 15 minutes will be towed. 223
Under the ADA, a covered entity is expected to build the price of a
reasonable accommodation into its pricing scheme. 224 For example, people
who need wheelchairs are not required to pay for the extra space that the
chair occupies. 225 It is because obesity has never been declared a disability
that policies like the one implemented by Southwest Airlines are allowed.
Otherwise, one could argue that the airlines would be required to eat the cost
of the extra seat, as they do space for a wheelchair. However, because
obesity itself is not a disability under the federal definitions, the airlines have
struck a balance by refunding the price whenever the flight is not full.226
217 Buxton, supra note 99, at 124.
218 See Southwest.com. Customer of Size Q&A, http://www.southwest.com/
travel center/cosqa.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Dan Fitzpatrick, Weighty Matter Pits Passengers Against Airlines, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Mar. 13, 2005, at A-1, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/
05072/470035.stm.
2 23 Id. at A- 15.
224 LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIS & ANITA SILVERS, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 93 (2000) ("A
customer or employee is entitled by the ADA to reasonable accommodation in the sense
that the public accommodation owner or employer must treat the customer or worker in
terms of his or her gross, not net, value added to the firm.").
225 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 382 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled
individuals and requiring airlines to have space for wheelchairs on the aircraft).
226 Fitzpatrick, supra note 222; Southwest Airlines Travel Policies, supra note 218.
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The criticism of these policies may well be unwarranted. In order to
remain a low-fare air carrier, Southwest has to make the most out of the
space that it has available. Selling two seats for the price of one would
inevitably lower profits for the airline, and as a consequence raise airfares for
all passengers. A company spokesperson has noted that "[flor every 10
letters [they] get, nine of them will say they did not enjoy their flight because
someone was sitting on them. '227 Moreover, its website notes that 98% 'of
extra seat purchases qualify for the refund.228 This accommodation seems
reasonable and is supported by the ACAA's implementing regulations. 229
IV. EEOC v WATKINS MOTOR LINES AND THE CURRENT STATE OF
OBESITY AS A PERCEIVED DISABILITY
The Sixth Circuit was the most recent federal court to test the boundaries
of obesity as a disability under the ADA. Following a similar line of
reasoning as the California Supreme Court in Cassista v. Community
Foods,230 the Sixth Circuit continues to insist that each individual obese
plaintiff filing suit for employment discrimination under Title I of the ADA
prove that his or her obesity has a physiological cause, regardless of which
definition of disability they are attempting to prove.231
In 1990, Stephen Grindle was hired by Watkins Motor Lines (Watkins)
as a dock worker. 232 At that time, Grindle weighed 345 pounds.233 His job
description included "climbing, kneeling, bending, stooping, balancing,
reaching, and repeated heavy lifting. '234 Grindle successfully performed
these duties for five years until 1995, when he nearly fell off a ladder after a
rung broke injuring his knee.235 He returned to work the day after the
227 Fitzpatrick, supra note 222.
228 Southwest Airlines Travel Policies, supra note 218.
229 In fact, the implementing regulations specifically provide that "[c]arriers are not
required to furnish more than one seat per ticket or to provide a seat in a class of service
other than the one the passenger has purchased." 14 C.F.R. § 382.38(i) (2006).
230 Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 1993).
231 EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 442-43 (6th Cir. 2006). This
reasoning is consistent with the court's decision in Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808-
09 (6th Cir. 1997), in which the court also insisted that the aggrieved policemen show
that their obesity had physiological causes-regardless of whether they were bringing the
claim under the perceived disability prong.
232 Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 438.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
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incident and continued to work overtime hours throughout the month.236 He
then went on a leave of absence to recover from the injuries he sustained.237
Watkins had a policy that required termination of any employee who
remained on leave of absence for more than 180 days. 238 Grindle was given a
return to work release from Dr. Zancan days before his time was up, but
Watkins refused to accept it, arguing that Zancan had not reviewed Grindle's
job description prior to signing it.239 Instead, Watkins ordered Grindle to see
its own expert, Dr. Lawrence. In his evaluation of Grindle, Dr. Lawrence
noted that "the most notable item is that the patient weighs 405 [pounds]. 240
Based on his evaluation of Grindle, Dr. Lawrence concluded that even
though Grindle met all Department of Transportation standards, "he could
not safely perform the requirements of his job."'24 ' Grindle was then placed
on safety hold, surpassed the 180-day leave of absence maximum, and was
terminated.242
Grindle registered a complaint with the EEOC, which filed suit on his
behalf, claiming that Watkins had violated the ADA when it regarded
Grindle's obesity as a disability and mistakenly believed that he could not
perform his job.243 The district court granted Watkins's motion for summary
judgment, "finding that non-physiologically caused obesity is not an
'impairment' under [the] ADA. '244 The EEOC appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit noted that there are two separate ways that an
individual without a disability could be covered by the ADA: "(1) a covered
entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially
limits one or more major life activities." 245 The EEOC made its argument
under the second definition.246 Thus, the court reasoned that to succeed, the
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 438.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 439.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 439.
245 Id. at 440 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)).
246 Id. The EEOC would have had a much easier, and perhaps more successful,
argument had it brought the claim under the first definition. There, it would only have
had to prove that Watkins regarded Grindle's obesity as a substantially limiting
impairment, an argument that was successfully made on similar facts in EEOC v. Texas
2007] 1789
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
EEOC must establish that Grindle was perceived to be substantially limited
by an actual impairment. 247
The court dismissed the EEOC's argument that an impairment can be
shown by either proving a physiological condition or by simply showing that
the plaintiff is morbidly obese, as is suggested by the EEOC's own
regulation. 248 Instead, it noted that "physical characteristics that are not the
result of a physiological disorder are not considered impairments for the
purposes of determining either actual or perceived disability. '249 Unlike the
Ninth Circuit,250 the Sixth Circuit in Watkins did not accept morbid obesity
as an impairment as a matter of law, thus perpetuating the need for a case-by-
case analysis of obesity suits-requiring even morbidly obese plaintiffs to
prove a physiological cause for their condition.
V. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF OBESITY AS A DISABILITY
Although an increasing number of courts now require an obese
individual to prove that his or her obesity has a physiological cause in order
to receive the protection of the ADA, it is unclear why these same courts
have consistently failed to recognize the ever-growing scientific evidence
tending to prove that morbid obesity itself is a disease with physiological
causes and consequences. Requiring additional evidence of a physiological
cause for a clearly physiological disease seems to be not only redundant, but
inherently unfair. As one author suggested, "the courts' insistence on
Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 975-79 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Instead, following the argument it
made in its amicus curiae brief for Cook v. Rhode Island, the EEOC attempted to
persuade the court that morbid obesity was a disability as a matter of law. Frisk, supra
note 62, at 17.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 441-42. Similar reasoning was used by the court in Andrews v. Ohio,
where it held that to succeed even under the perceived disability prong, the plaintiff
would have to show that his obesity had a physiological cause. Andrews v. Ohio, 104
F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1997). Interestingly, this reasoning is based on the EEOC's
regulation, which by its plain language would imply that the plaintiff could show either
morbid obesity or a physiological cause. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2007):
It is important to distinguish between conditions that are impairments and physical,
psychological, environmental, cultural and economic characteristics that are not
impairments. The definition of the term "impairment" does not include physical
characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or
muscle tone that are within "normal" range and are not the result of a physiological
disorder.
249 Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 442 (citing Andrews, 104 F.3d at 808) (internal
citations omitted).
250 Gaddis v. Oregon, 21 F. App'x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished).
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identifying an underlying physiological disorder may reflect a societal desire
to avoid according legal protections to persons whose obesity can be
attributed to their own sloth, gluttony or lack of self-discipline rather than
any 'medical' cause." 251
The purpose of the ADA is to "provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with
disabilities" 252 and to protect those people who suffer from stigmatized
conditions. 253 Evidence overwhelmingly shows that the obese suffer the
consequences of this stigmatization in employment situations, including
lower wages and the denial of insurance benefits. 254 "It would be difficult,
for example, to claim that the exaggerated solicitude displayed toward people
with serious cardiovascular or lower-back impairments is more invidious
than the revulsion and contempt displayed towards [an obese woman]. ' '255
Hence, under the rationale of stigmatization, obesity is a perfect candidate for
the ADA's protection.
However, the courts' hesitance to recognize obesity as an actual
disability goes beyond discriminatory stereotypes. A major concern of
accepting obesity as a disability, even just morbid obesity as the EEOC
advances, has to do with the possibility of a large increase in litigation.256
When the ADA was first passed into law, Congress spoke of 43 million
Americans with disabilities. 257 Including the obese in that figure would add
approximately an additional 59 million Americans 258 to the number, more
251 FRANCIS & SILVERS, supra note 224, at 120.
252 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303,332.
253 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (noting that
the basic purpose of the RA "is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs
or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others.").
254 See Rebecca Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Bias, Discrimination, and Obesity, 9
OBESITY RES. 788, 790-95 (2001), available at http://www.obesityresearch.org/
cgi/reprint/9/12/788.
255 FRANCIS & SILVERS, supra note 224, at 151.
256 Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997) ("This would make
the central purpose of the statutes, to protect the disabled, incidental to the operation of
the 'regarded as' prong, which would become a catch-all cause of action for
discrimination based on appearance, size, and any number of other things far removed
from the reasons the statutes were passed.").
257 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). Though this number was not intended to be a cap on
the number of recognized disabilities, it is an indication of the severity of conditions that
the Act was intended to cover.
258 NAASO:The Obesity Society, What is Obesity http://www.obesity.org (click on
"About Obesity" on the side bar, the "Fact Sheets" in the center, then "What is
Obesity?") (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
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than twice that which the authors of the Act had in mind. Not only does
including the obese exponentially increase the possible number of
discrimination suits, but it risks skyrocketing costs and diluting judicial
resources. Concerning the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton,2 59 a
quadriplegic man wrote to the New York Times that "the effect of diluting the
definition of disability by including nearly half of the population would
ultimately ... hurt those who need accommodation the most."260
The trick, then, is to provide protection to obese individuals who have
been discriminated against because of stereotypes and misperceptions about
the condition of obesity without opening the flood gates to including obesity
itself as an actual disability. Currently, courts seem to be most comfortable
proceeding with obesity suits under the "perceived as" definition of
disability.261 In so doing, they have declined to find obesity as an actual
disability, but have instead recognized it as disabling in certain contexts,
through the attitudes and actions of others.
To be covered under the perceived disability prong, however, an
increasing number of courts have read the statute to require a plaintiff to
allege that his or her employer "regarded him as having an 'impairment'
within the meaning of the statute[]. ' '262 In other words, the employer must
have regarded the obese individual as having a condition that would be
otherwise covered by the Act. Coming full circle, the court then requires the
plaintiff to show that his obesity is an actual "impairment" under the Act.263
This has been interpreted to require a showing of a physiological cause.264
Courts hearing obesity discrimination suits under the ADA should heed
the EEOC's advice and recognize morbid obesity as an impairment as a
matter of law. Recognizing it as a disease that necessarily has a physiological
cause would simply alleviate the need for each individual plaintiff to prove a
medical cause for his or her own condition, but would still require a showing
that the condition was disabling through the views and attitudes of others..
259 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (holding that the
finding of a disability should be determined with regard to the corrective measures
available to an individual and that an impairment did not exist where the plaintiff s vision
was almost perfect with corrective glasses).
260 FRANCIS & SILVERS, supra note 224, at 153.
261 EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436, 440-43 (6th Cir. 2006); Cook v.
R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1993);
EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 975-76 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
262 Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir. 1997). See also Andrews
v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1997); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp.
739, 743-44 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
263 Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 441-443.
264 See, e.g., Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 809-10 (6th Cir. 1997).
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This would address the concern of disabling stereotypes about the obese
through the perceived disability definition without opening the door to claims
under the actual disability definition. An overweight individual who does not
qualify as morbidly obese would still need to show that his condition is the
result of a physiological disorder.265 Moreover, because all potential
plaintiffs would still be required to show that they were regarded by their
employers as substantially limited in a major life activity, and that they are
otherwise qualified for the job, it is unlikely that accepting it as an
impairment would have an effect on the number of obesity discrimination
suits under the perceived definition.
To be clear, this is an argument for continuing to address obesity suits
under the perceived disability definition. Therefore, recognizing morbid
obesity as an impairment would not make Homer Simpson's quest266 for
"accommodation" much easier, as he did not suffer the consequences of his
employer's perceptions. "[O]besity is increasingly viewed as a medical
disability."267 Accepting that clinical morbid obesity should always be an
impairment is not to say that it will always be a disability. In line with the
purpose of the perceived disability definition, 268 courts have been
sympathetic to obesity suits under that definition if there is a physiological
cause.269 In these cases where the plaintiff simply seeks to prevent a
discriminatory employment practice, morbid obesity should be accepted as
physiological. While the courts are right to proceed cautiously in allowing
obesity discrimination suits, acknowledging that morbid obesity as a general
condition is physiological would not open the door to suits under the actual
disability definition of the ADA.270 Rather, it would recognize what is
quickly becoming a medical certainty, 271 and ease the plight for those who
suffer the consequences of "society's accumulated myths and fears" 272 that
can be just as disabling as more traditionally accepted disabilities in the
workplace.
265 Kuss, supra note 10, at 589.
266 The Simpsons, supra note 1.
267 Kuss, supra note 10, at 604.
268 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990).
269 See, e.g., EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 440-43 (6th Cir.
2006); Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 20-24
(1st Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 975-76 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
270 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
271 The New England Journal of Medicine has a collection of more than 80 articles
discussing the causes and effects of obesity. See The New England Journal of Medicine,
Collections by Disease or Topic: Obesity, http://content.nejm.org/cgi/collection/obesity
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
272 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990).
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